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TAKING COMPENSATION PRIVATE
Abraham Bell* and Gideon Parchomovsky**
In light of the expansive interpretation of the “public use” requirement, the
payment of “just compensation” remains the only meaningful limit on the
government’s eminent domain power and, correspondingly, the only safeguard of
private property owners’ rights against abusive takings. Yet, the current
compensation regime is suboptimal. While both efficiency and fairness require
paying full compensation for seizures by eminent domain, current law limits the
compensation to market value. Despite the virtual consensus about the
inadequacy of market compensation, courts adhere to it for a purely practical
reason: there is no way to measure the true subjective value of property to its
owner. Subjective value is neither observable nor verifiable to third parties and
courts cannot rely upon owners’ reports of the value they attach to their
properties. To date, the challenge of screening truthful from exaggerated
evaluation has proven insurmountable.
This Article solves the undercompensation conundrum. It offers a novel selfassessment mechanism that enables the payment of full compensation at
subjective value when private property is taken by eminent domain. Under the
proposed mechanism, property owners would get to set the price of the property
designated for condemnation. The government could then either take the property
at the designated price or abstain, leaving the property subject to two new
proposed restrictions. First, for the life of the owner, the property could not be
sold for less than the self-assessed price, adjusted on the basis of the local
housing price index. Second, the self-assessed price—discounted to take account
of the peculiarities of property tax assessments—would become the new
benchmark for the owner’s property tax liability.
This Article shows that under most conditions, these restrictions will induce
honest reporting by owners while reducing the transaction costs created by the
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** Professor, University of Pennsylvania Law School; Visiting Professor, Bar Ilan
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compensation process. The result is a dramatically more efficient law of eminent
domain that is also far more respectful of private property rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Eminent domain is a controversial prerogative, and an obvious challenge to
vital private property rights. It is not surprising, therefore, that this power has
sparked a great deal of public interest and scholarly debate. The Takings
Clause of the Fifth Amendment places two restrictions on the power of the
government to take private property. First, taken property must be put to public
use. Second, just compensation must be paid to aggrieved property owners. The
public use requirement has gradually been rendered virtually non-existent in
light of the Supreme Court’s rulings in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff
and then in Kelo v. City of New London that the public use clause is
conterminous with the government police powers.1 Consequently, “just
compensation” remains the only meaningful safeguard of private property
rights and the only check on government abuse of its eminent domain power.
It is curious, therefore, that while public use continues to attract scholarly
interest, very little attention has been paid as of late to the arguably more
important requirement of “just compensation.”2 As it currently stands, the law
of eminent domain compensation suffers from two principal flaws. First,
1. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005); Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff,
467 U.S. 229 (1984).
2. Cf. Christopher Serkin, The Meaning of Value: Assessing Just Compensation for
Regulatory Takings, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 677 (2005) (identifying valuation mechanisms for
just compensation).
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although the Takings Clause requires, in principle, the payment of
compensation for the full loss occasioned on property owners,3 in practice,
current law settles for the payment of the market value of the property taken—a
benchmark that often falls far short of the reserve price of the aggrieved
owner.4 Thus, takings law permits undercompensation whenever the reserve
value of the property owner exceeds market price. Second, many important
compensation doctrines require courts specifically to ignore different kinds of
value lost to owners of taken property, such as goodwill.5
The problem of inadequate compensation has not gone unnoticed by
courts.6 Judge Posner wrote in Coniston Corp. v. Village of Hoffman Estates:
Compensation in the constitutional sense is . . . not full compensation, for
market value is not the value that every owner of property attaches to his
property but merely the value that the marginal owner attaches to his property.
Many owners are “intramarginal,” meaning that because of relocation costs,
sentimental attachments, or the special suitability of the property for their
particular (perhaps idiosyncratic) needs, they value their property at more than
its market value . . . . 7

Undercompensation is both unfair and inefficient. It is unfair because it
deprives property owners of part of the value of the property taken. As Justice
Black famously stated in Armstrong v. United States, “The Fifth Amendment’s
[just compensation] guarantee . . . was designed to bar Government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and
justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”8 An award that falls short of
full compensation potentially wrongs the condemnee.9 As for efficiency,
undercompensation may induce excessive takings because it allows the
government to ignore part of the cost it imposes on private property owners
through its land use policies. Theorists have pointed out that government
decision making is subject to fiscal illusion, which prompts the government to
believe that actions that do not affect the budget are, in fact, costless.10 On this

3. For discussion generally, see infra Part I.
4. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949) (“[L]oss to the
owner of nontransferable values deriving from his unique need for property or idiosyncratic
attachment to it, like loss due to an exercise of the police power, is properly treated as part of
the burden of common citizenship.”); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943)
(explaining that, for practical reasons, “courts early adopted, and have retained, the concept
of market value” in determining takings compensation); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S.
246, 255 (1934) (stating that just compensation “does not exceed market value fairly
determined”).
5. See infra Part II.A.
6. See also Curtis J. Berger & Patrick J. Rohan, The Nassau County Study: An
Empirical Look into the Practices of Condemnation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 430 (1967).
7. 844 F.2d 461, 464 (7th Cir. 1988).
8. 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
9. See infra Part I.A.
10. See infra Part I.B.
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theory, partial compensation will lead the government to take too much.11
Additionally, by failing to pay full compensation for its takings, the
government incentivizes property owners to oppose potentially societally
beneficial projects.12
It bears emphasis that eminent domain law has adopted fair market value
as the compensation benchmark despite its tension with the goal of full
compensation for purely practical reasons—that is, “[b]ecause of serious
practical difficulties in assessing the worth an individual places on particular
property at a given time . . . .”13 Subjective value is neither observable nor
readily ascertainable by third parties; only the aggrieved property owners know
the true value of their property. Yet, courts cannot rely on the testimonies of
aggrieved property owners for fear that they would exaggerate the value they
place on property in order to increase the compensation they receive. And
courts have no reasonable means at their disposal for reviewing the accuracy of
owners’ self-serving reports.14
Moreover, more accurate compensation mechanisms would likely
exacerbate the already considerable problems of high litigation and other
transaction costs. Aggrieved owners often invest considerable resources in
legal battles with the government in an effort to raise compensation awards.
Regardless of the ultimate outcome, the negotiations and litigation that attend
eminent domain exercises cost time and money both to private property owners
and the government. Thus, the current compensation mechanism generates
considerable efficiency losses without yielding meaningful offsetting
benefits.15
Recognizing the inherent inefficiencies of the existing compensation
regime, some scholars have proposed that compensation be withheld for certain
small takings.16 Others have doubted the wisdom of eminent domain power
altogether.17
Indeed, it is difficult to devise a compensation mechanism that would
lower transaction costs while simultaneously enhancing accuracy and ending
undercompensation. The more we invest in determining the condemnee’s
subjective value, the costlier the compensation process. Conversely,
compromising the accuracy of the compensation mechanism by eschewing

11. See infra Part I.B..
12. See infra Part I.C.
13. United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979).
14. See Lee Anne Fennell, Revealing Options, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1399, 1404 (2005)
(noting the problem of false valuation statements).
15. See Michael A. Heller & James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law
of Takings, 112 HARV. L. REV. 997 (1999); Patricia Munch, An Economic Analysis of
Eminent Domain, 84 J. POL. ECON. 473 (1976).
16. See, e.g., Heller & Krier, supra note 15.
17. See, e.g., Munch, supra note 15.
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payment for such items as goodwill lowers the cost of the process but only at
the price of greater undercompensation of subjective value.18
In this Article, we introduce an innovative bargaining mechanism that can
dramatically reduce the scope of both problems, and importantly, does so at a
very small cost. At the core of our model lies a self-assessment apparatus that
is designed to induce potential condemnees to accurately report the subjective
value they place on the property to be taken. The basic version of the
mechanism works as follows: at stage I, the government announces its intention
to take property by eminent domain. Thereafter, at stage II, affected property
owners name the price they want for their properties. Finally, at stage III, the
government either proceeds with its plan and seizes the properties at the named
price or abandons the proposed taking. If the government decides not to take
property at the self-assessed price, the owner will retain title to the properties,
but will become subject to two restrictions. First, for the life of the owner, the
property cannot be sold for less than the self-assessed price. If the property is
transferred for less than that price, the owner will have to pay the shortfall to
the government.19 Second, the self-assessed price will become the benchmark
for the owner’s property tax liability. As we will show, the combined effect of
partial inalienability and enhanced tax liability should suffice to keep the owner
honest in reporting her subjective value.
To see how the proposed mechanism would work, consider the following
example. Imagine that the city of Chicago declares its desire to use its power of
eminent domain to seize Blackacre, a property owned by the Epstein family.
The property has an assessed value of $200,000 on the city property tax rolls
and a market value of $300,000.20 Assume, however, that the Epstein family
values the property at $400,000 and names this amount as the price of realty for
the purpose of the taking. If the City of Chicago decides to take the property, it
will have to pay the Epsteins $400,000 in compensation. If, however, the city
decides to forego the taking, the Epsteins will not be able to sell Blackacre for
less than $400,000, and the property tax they have to pay will be based on the
same figure.21
18. By contrast to market value, special subjective value is presumed to be zero absent
evidence indicating otherwise.
19. We thank William Fischel for helping us think through this element of our
proposed mechanism. Any flaws in the mechanism, of course, are solely our responsibility.
20. Perhaps the most famous example of the unmooring of assessed value from market
value in property tax assessment may be found in California’s Proposition 13 passed in
1978. In addition to freezing assessed property values to 1975 levels, Proposition 13 capped
property tax rates at 1% of assessed value and limited reassessment rates to 2% per year. See
Arthur O’Sullivan, Limits on Local Property Taxation: The United States Experience, in
PROPERTY TAXATION AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCE 177, 180 (Wallace E. Oates ed.,
2001). For discussion of the mechanisms of tax assessment in Illinois, including Cook
County, see Nina H. Tamburo, The Illinois Property Tax System: An Overview, 10 LOY.
CONSUMER L. REV. 186 (1998).
21. As we explain in Part III.A., infra, the model would permit sale of the property if
the Epsteins paid the difference between this amount and the eventual sale price. For
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The virtues of the self-assessment mechanism are significant. It provides
more accurate compensation for subjective value, while dramatically reducing
transaction costs created by the compensatory process. Since owners name
their price, they will state a value that is no less than their subjective value, as
there is no reason for them to voluntarily part with their property for less than
the full subjective value. However, owners will not state a price greater than
the subjective value, lest they subject themselves to excessive tax liability and
limitations on alienation.22 Moreover, the mechanism is self-policing and
therefore should reduce the costs of assessing and litigating property
valuations. By relieving both sides of the need to hire expert assessors and legal
counsel and to engage in extensive evidence collection, our proposal
significantly lowers the transaction costs associated with compensation.
The basic model gives rise to one potential peril, however. The
government may announce its intent to take properties by eminent domain
simply to boost its tax revenues. To keep the government from strategically
abusing its power, we complement the basic model with a “decoupling”
mechanism that severs the amount paid by the owner for high self-assessed
valuations and for redeeming a property’s inalienability restriction from the
amount collected by the government. We show that with this adjustment and
several other refinements to account for the effects of inflation, shocks to the
housing markets, and other price changes,23 our mechanism can be employed
in almost all eminent domain cases and furthermore, may be easily extended to
cases of regulatory takings.
The Article unfolds in four parts. In Part I, we review the reigning theories
of compensation and demonstrate why they mandate full and “just”
compensation for government takings. This Part examines the theoretical and
practical flaws with market-based valuation for takings compensation and pays
particular attention to empirical data verifying the phenomenon of systematic
undercompensation. Part II presents our proposal for declaring subjective value
and discusses the parameters that affect owners’ reports. Part III explores
potential drawbacks and limitations and compares our proposal to alternatives.
A brief conclusion follows.

simplicity’s sake, we assume at this point that the taxes will be paid on nominal values.
22. As we discuss in Part III.B., infra, we do not claim that our model precisely
calibrates incentives nor that it produces first-best results.
23. We suggest that these factors can be dealt with by pegging the self-assessed price
to an appropriate local housing price index. The index would adjust prices both upward and
downward so that homeowners would not be unduly punished for downturns in the market,
or unduly rewarded for upticks. Thus, in our example, if during the year following the selfassessment, the local housing price index goes up by 6%, the self-assessed value would
similarly be increased by 6%, i.e., from $400,000 to $424,000. Naturally, the index would
have to be one measuring similar prices for similar assets in similar locations in order to
truly reflect the market changes on the self-assessed value.
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I. THEORETIC JUSTIFICATIONS FOR JUST COMPENSATION
Eminent domain has long been accepted as an indispensable feature of the
sovereign powers of government. However, the immense scope of this
government power is not limitless. The Fifth Amendment of the Constitution
provides that government may only take private property for “public use” and
must always pay “just compensation” for the taken property.
Over time, the just compensation requirement has proven to be far more
important than the public use limitation. As the Supreme Court reaffirmed most
recently in Kelo v. City of New London,24 under federal constitutional law,
virtually any governmental action that is otherwise permitted by constitutional
law will satisfy the public use requirement. Notwithstanding a handful of
notable exceptions,25 federal constitutional law recognizes the states’ plenary
powers to act in the interests of “the public health, safety, morals, or general
welfare.”26 The states’ powers in this regard—generally labeled “police
powers”27—permit the undertaking of such diverse actions as the confiscation
and redistribution of private land holdings,28 and the imposition of
comprehensive zoning plans that severely limit the ability to build upon and
develop real estate holdings.29 Thus, it is difficult to conceive of a state action
against private property that would lack constitutional justification as being in
service of a public use.30 Federal constitutional law has effectively eliminated
the public use limitation on eminent domain.31
24. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
25. Perhaps the most prominent exception is the dormant commerce clause, which
prevents states from regulating interstate commercial activities. See, e.g., Cooley v. Bd. of
Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1851) (“Now the power to regulate commerce[] embraces a vast
field, containing not only many, but exceedingly various subjects, quite unlike in their
nature[,] some imperatively demanding a single uniform rule, operating equally on the
commerce of the United States in every port . . . . Whatever subjects of this power are in
their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly
be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.”).
26. Vill. of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (citations omitted).
27. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Proper Scope of the Police Power, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 429 (2004).
28. Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
29. See Euclid, 272 U.S. at 379-80.
30. The police power is the state’s regulatory power. D. Benjamin Barros, The Police
Power and the Takings Clause, 58 U. MIAMI L. REV. 471, 473 (2004). The courts grant
nearly unlimited discretion to the state’s regulation of economic affairs. RONALD D.
ROTUNDA & JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE AND
PROCEDURE § 15.4 (3d ed. 1999). In the arena of takings, the Supreme Court has ruled that
“[t]he ‘public use’ requirement [of the Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause] is . . .
coterminous with the scope of a sovereign’s police powers.” Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 240.
31. In state law, public use requirements continue to have some significance. For
example, in County of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684 N.W.2d 765 (Mich. 2004), the Supreme
Court of Michigan ruled that the use of eminent domain when private parties ultimately
acquire the property is permissible only when: (1) there exists a “public necessity of the
extreme sort” (e.g., highways, railroads, etc.); (2) the public retains continuing oversight
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Given the decline in importance of the “public use” requirement, the just
compensation requirement remains the only meaningful constitutional
safeguard against unlimited use of the eminent domain power.32 Not
surprisingly, the duty to pay just compensation has been analyzed by numerous
scholars, and a number of competing theories have been proposed to explain its
purpose and scope. Following convention, we divide these theories into three
major groupings: fairness-based justifications, efficiency-based justifications,
and public choice justifications.
A. Fairness-Based Justifications
The Supreme Court announced a fairness-based justification for the
compensation requirement in Armstrong v. United States.33 Per Justice Black,
fairness in the takings context requires that the cost of takings not be
shouldered by a small group of property owners.34 Unfortunately, the Court
refrained from elaborating the means by which such fairness could be
determined.
Into this void stepped Frank Michelman.35 Drawing heavily on the work of
John Rawls, Michelman suggested that the fair compensation requirement
represents the legal regime that the citizenry would have chosen behind a veil
of ignorance. Specifically, Michelman argued that the scope of the just
compensation requirement is that which the citizenry would choose if it knew
of a governmental power of eminent domain in the abstract but did not know
how the burden of exercising that power would be distributed among the
general public.36
Essentially, Michelman assumed that if people had no knowledge of what
their future property holdings would be, they would nevertheless have a shared
notion of an acceptable risk of exposure to eminent domain. Since Michelman
developed his view before the important Supreme Court decision in Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,37 it is difficult precisely to
map his view onto current doctrine.38 However, it is clear that Michelman
believed that citizens would be willing to accept some risk of eminent
authority over the use of the land; or (3) the property is selected based on “facts of
independent public significance,” id. at 783 (internal quotation marks omitted). See also
Thomas W. Merrill, The Economics of Public Use, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 61 (1986).
32. See James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent
Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1278 (1985).
33. 364 U.S. 40 (1960).
34. Id. at 49.
35. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of “Just Compensation” Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
36. Id. at 1221-22.
37. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
38. Some of Michelman’s analysis appears to have been incorporated in part by the
Penn Central court. See id. at 128.
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domain—that is, Michelman’s citizenry would not require compensation for
every taking. Just as clearly, Michelman believed that citizens would not be
willing to leave their property fully exposed to government taking.39
Michelman’s framework heavily relies on John Rawls’s Justice as
Fairness.40 Rawls sought to uncover the terms of the hypothetical “social
contract” at which rational, self-regarding, and interdependent individuals
would arrive behind “a veil of ignorance.”41 Rawls further assumed that the
actors behind the veil of ignorance have information about the basic structure
of society but lack knowledge about their personal traits and status in the real
world.42 Rawls postulated that his thought experiment yields two principles for
designing social institutions. The first principle entitles each individual to the
maximum liberty compatible with the exercise of a like liberty by others.43 The
second principle (widely known as the “difference principle”) sanctions
deviations from the first principle so long as the positions subject to the
differential treatment are open to everyone, and the unequal treatment yields
the greatest advantage for the least well-off members of the group.44
Applying the two principles in the takings context, Michelman posited that
the first prohibits “all efficiency-motivated social undertakings, which have the
prima facie effect of impairing ‘liberties’ unequally, unless corrective measures
(compensation payments) are employed to equalize impacts.”45 The second,
however, justifies departures from the rule of full compensation “if it could be
shown that some other rule should be expected to work out best for each person
insofar as his interests are affected by the social undertakings giving rise to
occasions of compensation.”46 Under what circumstances, then, would a “lessthan-full-compensation” be fair? In answering this question, Michelman first
identified the key parameters that affect the analysis. The first parameter—
“settlement costs”—denotes the cost of calculating and paying compensation to
aggrieved owners.47 The second—“demoralization costs”—represents the
psychological harm incomplete compensation occasions on condemnees and
their sympathizers and the forgone investment in property across the board that

39. Id. at 1214-24.
40. John Rawls, Justice as Fairness, 67 PHIL. REV. 164 (1958). John Rawls further
elaborates his theory at book length. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
41. RAWLS, supra note 40, at 136-42.
42. Id. at 136-37.
43. Id. at 60.
44. Id. George Klosko notes that “[t]here are differences in Rawls’s presentation of the
principles between Justice as Fairness and later works. In particular, the second principle in
Justice as Fairness is stated in terms of the advantage of everyone, rather than the least
advantaged.” George Klosko, Rawls’s Argument From Political Stability, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1882, 1882 n.4 (1994). It bears emphasis that Michelman’s article predated the
publication of A Theory of Justice and therefore relied on Justice as Fairness.
45. Michelman, supra note 35, at 1221.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1214.
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stems from the fear of undercompensatory takings.48 In the background lurk
presumed “efficiency gains”—net social gains explored more fully in
Michelman’s parallel utilitarian analysis.49
A stringent compensation regime invariably entails high settlement costs
that would occasionally thwart welfare-enhancing projects. Hence, such a
regime will in some cases leave everyone worse off, including the least
advantaged members of our society. A lax compensation regime, by contrast,
will allow efficient development projects to proceed but only at the cost of
imposing a disproportionate portion of the cost on certain members of our
society. Hence, a lax compensation regime may generate high demoralization
costs. Michelman suggested that compensation should be paid when settlement
costs are low, the gains from the government action are dubious, and “the harm
concentrated on one individual is unusually great.”50 On the other hand,
compensation may be denied when property owners who are burdened by the
government action also benefit from it or when the burden falls on the
shoulders of many people.51
At the end of the day, Michelman’s position appears to be that while not all
takings (broadly defined) require the payment of compensation, in those cases
where compensation ought to be paid, it must be paid in full. Michelman’s
analysis strikes a balance among the competing interests implicated in takings
law by exempting the government from the duty to compensate for many acts
that adversely affect property value. But in instances when the duty to
compensate does arise, property owners should be fully compensated for their
losses. The payment of less than full compensation in such cases would seem to
violate the demands of fairness.52
An alternative framework for evaluating the fairness of takings
compensation was advanced by Margaret Radin.53 Radin based her analysis on
her understanding of Freidrich Hegel’s personhood theory. Hegel’s work
highlighted the link between property and the self. To Hegel, property
48. Id.
49. Id. at 1214-18.
50. Id. at 1223.
51. Id. Although Michelman does not explicitly say this, subsequent commentators
interpreted his analysis as suggesting that government pay compensation when
demoralization costs exceed settlement costs but not otherwise. See DAVID A. DANA &
THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY TAKINGS 36 (2002).
52. It should be noted that Hanoch Dagan advances a different interpretation of
Michelman. Working from a distributive justice perspective, but relying heavily on
Michelman, Dagan proposes that takings compensation be used as a means of wealth
redistribution. Specifically, he argues that compensation amounts should be adjusted to the
recipient’s wealth. Under Dagan’s proposal, poor condemnees would likely receive greater
compensation than richer condemnees. See Hanoch Dagan, Takings and Distributive Justice,
85 VA. L. REV. 741, 783-95 (1999). For criticism, see Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Takings,
Efficiency, and Distributive Justice: A Response to Professor Dagan, 99 MICH. L. REV. 157
(2000).
53. Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982).
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constituted the mechanism by which humans achieve self-actualization. He
believed that the human will required material objects to manifest itself and
that without them individual freedom could not exist.54 Building on Hegel’s
theory, Radin introduced an important distinction between kinds of property.55
She divided the world of objects into two categories: nonfungible (or
“personal”) and fungible.56 Nonfungible goods, such as wedding rings or a
family home, are constitutive of their owner’s personality and hence create
special value for the owner above and beyond market value.57 Fungible objects,
by contrast, lack uniqueness and serve little purpose in constituting the self.58
Radin argued that property law should respect the distinction between fungible
and nonfungible goods and treat the two differently.59
Accordingly, Radin argued that compensation at market value would often
not suffice for the needs of justice. She proposed that owners have the right to
injunctive relief, or property rule protection, in cases involving nonfungible
goods while compensatory damages, or liability rule protection, would be
applied to all other cases.60 Radin explicitly noted that the personality theory
would support extending property rule protection to “a special class of property
like a family home.”61 And elsewhere, she wrote that compensation at market
value “seem[s] quite wrong in cases where property interests are apprehended
as personal and incommensurate with money[;]”62 in such cases paying market
value would be insufficient. Hence, the personality theory also rejects
compensation at fair market value for family homes and other personality-laden
assets and supports substituting the existing compensation measure for a higher
award or, in some cases, a complete ban on the taking.
B. Efficiency-Based Justifications
The most prominent efficiency-based explanation for compensation
references fiscal illusion. Fiscal illusion is the presumed habit of government
decisionmakers of ignoring costs that do not directly affect government inflows
54. GEORG WILHELM FRIEDRICH HEGEL, PHILOSOPHY OF RIGHT §§ 39-45 (T.M. Knox
trans., Oxford Univ. Press 1967) (1821).
55. Radin, supra note 53.
56. Id. at 960.
57. Id.
58. See id. at 986-88.
59. See id.
60. See id. at 988 (“[T]here would be a nice simplicity in hypothesizing that personal
property should be protected by property rules and that fungible property should be
protected by liability rules.”).
61. Id. at 1005-06. She also observed that such a limitation has not developed. Id. at
1006.
62. MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 154 (1993). Radin further
notes, “In such cases it may be difficult to decide whether compensatory justice requires
higher compensation or whether no compensation should be paid because the problem is
outside the scope of compensatory justice.” Id.
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and outflows. When operating under fiscal illusion, a state actor ignores any
costs of her action to private property owners resulting from takings, aside
from those that appear in the budget (such as lower tax yields). Thus,
government actors suffering from fiscal illusion see most of the benefits
engendered by uncompensated takings, but few of the costs. Takings without
compensation enhance the government coffers by adding property holdings
without significant cost.63 However, when compensation is not paid, most costs
are borne by the private property owners. Consequently, if government could
take without paying compensation, it would take too much.
The constitutional requirement of just compensation fixes the problem by
forcing the government to include private costs in government budgets. Once
the budget fully reflects social costs and benefits, fiscal illusion no longer
distorts the decision making process. To fully overcome the distorting effects
of fiscal illusion, takings law must mandate full compensation for losses
suffered by the owners of the taken property. If the government need pay only
for market value, but not for idiosyncratic or surplus subjective value, the
theory of fiscal illusion posits that the government will take too much, since it
will ignore surplus subjective and idiosyncratic value destroyed by the taking.
The fiscal illusion justification has been challenged by theorists who point
out that the payment of full compensation creates a moral hazard problem on
the side of property owners. In the context of takings compensation, theories of
moral hazard suggest that full recompense distorts property owners’ incentives.
Property owners may overdevelop property at risk of government taking,
knowing that they will receive compensation for any taking. On the one hand,
the owners know that they will enjoy the full upside of any increased value
resulting from the development if there is no taking. On the other hand, the
owners do not have to worry about recouping development costs if the
government seizes the property because the government will have to pay
compensation for the value of the property as developed.
To alleviate the moral hazard created by takings compensation, some
commentators have argued for either no compensation or reduced
compensation for takings. Louis Kaplow, incorporating an analysis of eminent
domain into a larger study of “transitions”—government policy changes that
impose gains and losses on private actors—opined that the optimal amount of
takings compensation is none.64 A similar result was reached by Lawrence
Blume, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, and Perry Shapiro in circumstances where the
decision to take is independent of the use to which the property is put.65 Both
63. The important costs for uncompensated takings are administrative costs and the
lost tax revenue from the now-public property.
64. See Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV.
509, 602 (1986) (“The basic economic framework suggests that, as a matter of economic
efficiency, compensation is unwise.”).
65. Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be
Paid?, 99 Q.J. ECON. 71 (1984). Thomas Miceli emphasized the flip side of this
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studies assumed that government policies are made efficiently and are not
affected by fiscal illusion.66
However, once these unrealistic assumptions are relaxed, the nocompensation recommendation can no longer be sustained. Blume, Rubenfeld,
and Shapiro explicitly recognized that a government that is susceptible to fiscal
illusion would make inefficient decisions unless it paid full compensation.67 In
other words, any policy of less than full compensation at subjective value
(except for the value of inefficient development) will fail to incentivize the
government properly.
Elsewhere, one of us has suggested that the tension between providing
optimal incentives to the government, on the one hand, and property owners,
on the other, may be diffused by introducing a contributory negligence standard
for takings compensation that would bar recovery for reckless
overdevelopment of property and thereby achieve double responsibility at the
margin.68 A different solution is associated with Blume, Rubenfeld, and
Shapiro, who posited that this result could be achieved by requiring lump sum
compensation at an amount approximating full value of the property absent
excessive development. In substance, these proposals are identical, albeit under
different terminology.69 Either way, full compensation leads to the most
efficient results, so long as compensation is not paid for excessive
development.
In cases where the government may choose from a variety of alternative
properties for achieving the same goal or where the government value is very
close to the market value, moral hazard is particularly unlikely. As Thomas
Miceli noted, in such cases, overinvestment by the owner runs the risk of
foiling the taking, leaving the owner with a wasted investment.70 As Gideon
Kanner has noted, the announcement of a pending government taking often
observation—excessive development may deter takings where full compensation is required.
Thus, a full compensation regime can ensure optimal land use. Thomas J. Miceli,
Compensation for the Taking of Land Under Eminent Domain, 147 J. INSTITUTIONAL &
THEORETICAL ECON. 354 (1991).
66. Blume et al., supra note 65, at 81, 88; Kaplow, supra note 64, at 521.
67. Blume et al., supra note 65, at 88. Kaplow expressed greater skepticism about the
argument but acknowledged that fiscal illusion could change the results of his model.
Kaplow, supra note 64, at 604-06.
68. Abraham Bell, Not Just Compensation, 13 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 29, 48
(2003).
69. Blume, Rubinfeld, and Shapiro provocatively wrote that in an environment of
fiscal illusion coupled with moral hazard, “no compensation is suboptimal, but so is the
payment of full compensation.” Blume et al., supra note 65, at 88. This statement is
somewhat misleading, as it refers to the inefficiency caused by payment of full
compensation inclusive of all development, including reckless overdevelopment. In a
separate article, Blume and Shapiro more explicitly suggested that moral hazard could be
eliminated by adjusting compensation to eliminate rewards for inefficient development.
Lawrence Blume & Perry Shapiro, Compensation for Takings: An Economic Analysis, 72
CAL. L. REV. 569, 619 (1984).
70. Miceli, supra note 65, at 362.
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results in takings blight, i.e., the precipitous decline of property values in the
targeted neighborhood. Thus, while current law does not bar recovery for
excessive development, the existence of takings blight strongly suggests that
this is not a serious problem.71 Thus, it is difficult to argue that moral hazard
presents a strong argument for less-than-full compensation.
C. Public Choice and Interest Group Payoffs
A different justification for compensation, focusing on the arena of
politics, was advanced by Daniel Farber.72 Like Kaplow, Farber proceeded
from an assumption of the efficiency of initial government decisions to take
property by eminent domain. However, Farber assumed a more complicated
political process, modeled on the insights of public choice theory. In Farber’s
model, an initial efficient proposal to take property for the benefit of society
would not be implemented until approved by a political process ruled by
interest groups. Here, Farber posited that efficient takings would likely be
blocked absent the payment of compensation. This is due to the probable way
government actions based on eminent domain will distribute costs and benefits.
In Farber’s view, the usual case involves a small number of affected properties
to be taken with widely spread public benefits. Thus, the owners of properties
designated for taking will comprise a small and well-motivated interest group
while the benefiting public will be scattered and poorly motivated (as the
benefits for any individual member of the public will be small).73
Implicitly relying upon Mancur Olson’s theory of the superior political
power of minority interest groups,74 Farber suggested that absent compensation
for government takings, targeted property owners will systematically foil
societally beneficial government actions in order to block personal loss. Farber
argued that compensation combats the power of this powerful property owner
interest group by paying it off.75 Once targeted property owners are mollified
by compensation payments, they will remove their objections to socially
beneficial projects and permit them to move forward.
71. See Robert H. Freilich, Planning Blight: The Anglo-American Experience, 29 URB.
LAW. vii, xi-xv (1997).
72. Farber’s article does not rely solely on the public choice/rent-seeking account
presented here; indeed, Farber acknowledged the plausibility of other economic explanations
for the compensation requirement. Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just
Compensation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 125, 137 (1992); see also Timothy J. Brennan &
James Boyd, Political Economy and the Efficiency of Compensation for Takings, 24
CONTEMP. ECON. POL’Y 188 (2005).
73. Farber, supra note 72, at 133-38. Kaplow briefly alludes to this possibility as well.
Kaplow, supra note 64, at 604-05.
74. MANCUR OLSON, JR., THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION AND THE THEORY OF
GROUPS (1965).
75. Farber, supra note 72, at 125 (“Public choice theory suggests that legislators
normally offer compensation to landowners whose property is taken for a project, because
they would form a powerful lobby against the project if not ‘bought off.’”).
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While Farber does not address the question of how much compensation
must be paid, it seems clear that the anchor should be full compensation. If
targeted property owners are systematically undercompensated, they will have
a strong incentive to lobby against beneficial government projects. The lobby
will only be neutralized when it is indifferent to the taking because it has been
fully compensated for the loss occasioned by the taking.76
II. THE FLAWS IN MARKET COMPENSATION
Thus far, we have discussed the theoretic case for full compensation. In
this Part, we shift our attention to the real world and discuss how compensation
works in practice. We show that the current compensation regime leads to
undercompensation and highlight the types of value excluded from
compensation under current doctrine: surplus subjective value, goodwill, and
“community premiums.” In addition, we look at the adverse effects of
transaction costs, particularly litigation costs.
A. Surplus Subjective Value and Goodwill
For fungible goods with readily available market substitutes there should
be no substantial gap between market value and the subjective value of the
owner. However, many types of property do not share this characteristic. For
example, perfect substitutes for a family home may rarely be found on the
market.77 Location, construction, and layouts naturally differ from home to
home. In addition, owners often derive additional enjoyment from unique
experiences and memories associated with the homestead.78 Consequently,
when government takes residential property it often wipes out substantial
subjective value in excess of market value. Many scholars have recognized the
gap between subjective and market value, albeit occasionally under different
names.79 James Krier and Christopher Serkin, for example, note that takings
law fails to compensate for the gap between subjective and market values, and
label it the consumer surplus.80
76. Cf. Nicole Stelle Garnett, The Neglected Political Economy of Eminent Domain,
105 MICH. L. REV. 101, 110-15 (2006) (noting that uncompensated surplus subjective value
probably derailed some proposed Chicago takings, and arguing that too-high compensation
will undermine efficient takings).
77. Many unique variables come together to form a family’s home, and it is difficult or
even impossible to replicate all of them in another perfect substitute available on the market.
78. The value of stable ownership should be distinguished from the “endowment
effect,” which causes individuals to value goods in their possession more than identical
goods in someone else’s possession. See, e.g., Richard Thaler, Toward a Positive Theory of
Consumer Choice, 1 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 39, 44 (1980).
79. See, e.g., 4 NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01 (3d ed. 2006); Durham, supra
note 32, at 1292; Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV.
957, 958-59; Garnett, supra note 76, 107-110; Merrill, supra note 31, at 82-85.
80. James E. Krier & Christopher Serkin, Public Ruses, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 859,
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Granted, not every taking of property results in a significant loss of surplus
subjective value. For instance, the taking of a nondescript warehouse in an area
where similar warehouses may be obtained is unlikely to occasion a loss of
excess subjective value.81 However, many takings of property are of
nonfungible assets that hold value to the owner in excess of the property’s
market value and of its nearest market substitutes.
Finally, even putting aside the loss of idiosyncratic sentimental value,
businesses may be harmed by the standard rules of market value compensation.
Businesses often have values as going concerns above the summed values of
their assets. The gap between the value of the business as a whole and the
assets comprising the business is called “goodwill” and it represents the unique
value of the business as a going concern.82 Many states do not compensate for
lost goodwill,83 and, as interpreted by the courts, the constitutional standard of
“just compensation” does not require compensation for this head of damages.84
B. Community Premiums
Large-scale projects add an additional dimension of lost subjective value to
takings.
Consider the notorious case of Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit.85 General Motors sought to build a new automobile manufacturing
facility in the residential neighborhood of Poletown in Detroit. At General
Motors’s behest, Detroit seized over one thousand residential properties,
several churches, a hospital, and more than one hundred businesses, destroying
the neighborhood in order to make way for the automobile plant.86 Poletown
residents lost not only the value of their residential properties as individual
units, but also the attendant community premium that stemmed from the
existence of the neighborhood as a whole.87

866.
81. Of course, warehouses can exhibit some of the same personalized characteristics as
a family home and so may also exhibit increased subjective value.
82. 26 AM. JUR. 2D Eminent Domain § 306 (2005).
83. See, e.g., City of Dunkirk v. Conti, 588 N.Y.S.2d 465 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992); State
v. Rogers, 772 S.W.2d 559 (Tex. App. 1989); Mich. State Highway Comm’n v. Gaffield,
310 N.W.2d 281 (Mich. Ct. App. 1981).
84. See, e.g., United States v. 0.88 Acres of Land, 670 F. Supp. 210 (W.D. Mich.
1987); State v. Ensley, 164 N.E.2d 342 (Ind. 1960); Williams v. State Highway Comm’n,
113 S.E.2d 263 (N.C. 1960).
85. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981).
86. See Ilya Somin, Overcoming Poletown: County of Wayne v. Hathcock, Economic
Development Takings, and the Future of Public Use, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1005; Ilya
Somin, Michigan Should Alter Property Grab Rules, DETROIT NEWS, Jan. 8, 2004, at 11A.
87. Cf. Garnett, supra note 76; Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling
Mayberry: Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CAL. L. REV. 75, 139-41
(2004).
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The property owner’s enjoyment of part of the community premium is a
potentially important component of subjective value not reflected in the market
value of an individual property. However, current takings doctrine does not
offer any compensation for the loss of the community premium.
C. Bargaining, Litigation, and Transaction Costs
Private property rights activists allege that the undercompensation problem
is further exacerbated by the government’s superior bargaining position in its
negotiations with owners. It is often the practice of the government to try to
negotiate a voluntary transfer prior to resorting to eminent domain.88 A
voluntary settlement is advantageous for the government as it saves the
government potential litigation costs as well as negative publicity. Private
property rights champions and eminent domain practitioners caution, however,
that the settlement amount offered by the government in pretakings
negotiations is much lower than the fair market value, and owners who agree to
accept it receive lower compensation than their neighbors who refuse the offer
and seek instead legal determination of just compensation. Various anecdotal
horror stories about government’s abuse of its bargaining power are brought to
substantiate this claim.
For example, in a recent eminent domain case in Virginia, the local board
of commissioners awarded a farmer approximately 2000% of the initial
government appraisal for his land ($2.4 million instead of $112,000).89
Similarly, a jury awarded the owner of one of the properties that was
condemned for the construction of General Motors’s Poletown plant in Detroit
almost 1500% of the initial government offer ($5.1 million instead of
$357,000).90 According to another report, “For years, the Minnesota
Department of Transportation has taken private land for road projects and
offered the owners substantially less than the land was worth.”91 Occasionally,
the Department of Transportation commissioned more than one appraisal and
chose to negotiate with property owners based on a low appraisal without
disclosing the existence of higher estimates. Property owners complained that
these “‘low-ball’ offers have compelled them to spend thousands of dollars to
get their own appraisals, hire attorneys, and fight for a fair price for land they
didn’t even want to sell.”92 For example, one family rejected a $175,000 offer
it had received from the agency, hired an attorney, and eventually won an
88. See Berger & Rohan, supra note 6, at 440-42.
89. See Press Release, Va. Farm Bureau Fed’n, Farmer Wins Compensation in
Eminent Domain Case (Apr. 21, 2005), available at http://www.vafb.com/news/2005/
april/042105_1.htm.
90. See Ackerman Ackerman & Dynkowski, Case Study: General Motors Poletown
Plant, http://www.ackerman-ackerman.com/case.php?case=poletown.
91. Dan Browning, MnDOT’s Tactics Squeeze Landowners, MINNEAPOLIS STAR TRIB.,
Sept. 21, 2003, at 1A.
92. Id.
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award of $420,000; but the legal battle cost $53,000 in appraisal and attorney
fees.93 Other Minnesotans whose land was condemned complained that the
“high cost of fighting has forced many of them to settle for less than they
deserve” and that even those who ultimately received fair market value “c[a]me
out behind, financially.”94 Other stories of low-balling abound. Indeed, the
conventional wisdom among eminent domain practitioners is that government
will always try to get land on the cheap.
But are these stories representative? Or more importantly, do they really
prove the existence of widespread undercompensation? One of the few
empirical studies on the subject found widespread and intentional
undercompensation in takings settlements. The Nassau County Study,95 a 1967
examination of takings compensation in Nassau County, New York, provides
an in-depth look at the compensation practices of that county from 1960 to
1964. Organized by Curtis J. Berger and Patrick J. Rohan, the study covers
over 2409 parcels of land which were subject to either total or partial takings
over that five-year span.96 Berger and Rohan noted that the County would hire
“fixed-fee” appraisers to measure the value of the condemned land, and the
appraisers were paid a flat fee for the amount of land to be taken, regardless of
the complexity of the appraisal. The result was a surfeit of appraisals based on
a “single, unsubstantiated opinion as to value” and high likelihood of error in
assessing the value of land.97 In some more complicated cases, a second,
higher-paid appraiser would be contracted. Only about half of these second
appraisals came within ten percent of the value of the first appraisal, further
undercutting confidence in the fixed-fee appraiser’s declaration.98
Risk-averse owners would therefore prefer to settle for sub-market
compensation in order to avoid the risk of adverse errors in the appraisal
process. And, indeed, Berger and Rohan showed that 85.7% of completed
takings in their study were finalized by a settlement agreement,99 88.3% of the
settlements resulted in the claimants receiving less than the County’s mean
appraisal for their land, and 29.3% of claimants received less than 70% of the
mean appraised value.100
However, another empirical study depicts a far more complicated picture.
In her study of eminent domain compensation in Chicago, Patricia Munch
Danzon found that current compensation doctrine leads to both
undercompensation and overcompensation: owners of high-value properties
tend to get overcompensated while owners of low-value lots often get
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Berger & Rohan, supra note 6.
96. Id. at 435.
97. Id. at 439.
98. Id. at 439-40.
99. Id. at 440.
100. Id. at 442.
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undercompensated.101 Danzon theorized that what accounts for this result is the
presence of symmetric litigation costs and the inadvertent cross-subsidies of
government legal costs.102
Like private property owners, the government stands to incur litigation
costs when its attempt to secure consensual transfer fails. However, the
calculus of private property owners is dramatically different than that of the
government. Since each owner has only one lot at stake, her decision about
how much to invest in legal representation depends directly on the value of the
lot. Owners of high value lots who have a lot at stake have an incentive to hire
top legal advisors while owners of low value lots obtain lower quality legal
representation. By contrast, the government engages in numerous legal
proceedings, and it has a permanent staff of lawyers on standby. These lawyers
are paid a steady salary and do not receive differential compensation based on
the value of the condemned property. Rather, the government pays an optimal
amount for its legal staff when averaged over the total expected cost of eminent
domain cases, meaning that in any individual case, the government will
probably pay too much or too little. In low value cases, the government lawyers
are probably overqualified, and the government effectively overpays for legal
representation. Conversely, for high value cases, the government lawyers are
probably underqualified, and the government receives inadequate
representation. Consequently, the government’s legal counsel will likely
outperform the owner’s counsel for low-value property while being
outperformed by the lawyers of high-value property owners.
Danzon found that “[a]s a rough approximation, a $7000 parcel receives
about $5000, a $13,000 property breaks even, and a $40,000 parcel may get
two or three times its market value.”103 Thus, she characterized eminent
domain as “a tax on low-valued and a subsidy on high-valued properties.”104
This distributive result is, to say the least, unattractive.
Although Danzon’s work fails to support the belief that the government
pays submarket prices due to a superior bargaining position, the inexactness of
market appraisal almost certainly does lead to suboptimal compensation. There
can be little doubt that, as Thomas Merrill has written, “the concept of fair
market value is essentially a fiction in the context of takings of property,” given
the absence of thick markets in which to measure value accurately.105
101. Munch, supra note 15. Throughout this Article, we refer to Munch by her current
last name, Danzon, rather than her maiden name.
102. Id. at 482-84.
103. Id. at 488. The estimates are based on a study of land acquisitions by the Chicago
Department of Urban Renewal from 1962-1970. Id. at 485.
104. Id. at 488.
105. Thomas W. Merrill, Incomplete Compensation for Takings, 11 N.Y.U. ENVTL.
L.J. 110, 116 (2002). Merrill adds that “value is fixed based on an opinion or educated guess
about what the negotiated price of the property would have been if, contrary to fact, the
owner had sought to sell it and a willing buyer had sought to buy it on the day of the taking
. . . using various valuation techniques similar to those used in appraising property in other
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Many states have enacted legislation designed to “restore” the balance
between property owners and government. As Nicole Garnett has noted, nearly
twenty states offer some kind of subsidy for condemnees’ litigation
expenses.106 Some states leave the subsidies to the courts’ discretion, and some
allow only the payment of certain kinds of expenses, such as expert witness
fees.107 Others, moreover, require the payment of litigation expenses where the
final compensation award substantially exceeds the government’s initial
offer.108 No state specifically addresses the distributive problems identified by
Danzon.
III. A SELF-ASSESSMENT MODEL OF EMINENT DOMAIN COMPENSATION
Our discussion thus far has demonstrated two central points. First, as a
general rule, fairness and efficiency theories require payment of full
compensation at the property owner’s value in those cases where compensation
is warranted.109 Second, existing compensation doctrine does not ensure
property owners full compensation. In this Part, we propose an alternative
compensation mechanism that aligns compensation practice with the demands
of efficiency and fairness. In explaining our mechanism, we will highlight its
advantages relative to existing compensation doctrine. In addition, we will
show how it may be used not only for government-declared takings but also in
non-market contexts . . . .” Id. at 116-17.
106. Garnett, supra note 76, 129 & n.175.
107. The laws of at least three other states—Colorado, Minnesota, and New
Hampshire—allow condemnees to recover expert fees. See MINN. STAT. § 117.175(2)
(2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 498-A:27 (2007); In re Ribblesdale, Inc., 513 A.2d 360,
360 (N.H. 1986); Keller v. Miller, 63 Colo. 304, 313-14 (1917).
108. Sixteen states have enacted statutes that award full or partial reimbursement for
court costs and attorney’s fees to private property owners in eminent domain litigation.
Generally speaking, Alaska, California, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, Oregon, South
Dakota, Washington, and Wisconsin mandate such awards when the litigation results in a
greater award to the condemnee. See ALASKA R. CIV. PRO. 72(k)(3) (2007); CAL. CIV. PROC.
CODE §§ 1268.710, 1268.720 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 73.092(1) (2007); IOWA CODE
§ 6B.33 (2007); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 213.66(3) (2007); MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-30305(2) (2007); OR. REV. STAT. § 35.346(7)(a) (2007); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 21-35-23
(2007); WASH. REV. CODE § 8.25.070(1)(b) (2007); WIS. STAT. § 32.28(3)(d) (2007). It
should be noted that most of these states require the compensation awarded at trial to be
greater than the relevant government offer by a margin of 10% to 30%. Delaware, Idaho,
Kansas, Louisiana, Nebraska, New York, Oklahoma, and South Carolina give courts
discretion to award court costs and attorney fees to successful condemnees, but do not
mandate such action. See DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 6111(3) (2007); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 7711A(8) (2007); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 26-509 (2007); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 19:8 & 19:109
(2007) (attorney’s fees only); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-720 (2007); N.Y. EM. DOM. PROC. LAW
§ 701 (2007); OKLA. STAT. tit. 27, § 11(3) (2007); S.C. CODE ANN. § 28-2-510(b) (2007).
Some states in this group also require the final award to exceed the relevant government
offer by a certain margin.
109. It should be clear that the question of which acts of government mandate
compensation under the Takings Clause is a complicated one beyond the scope of this paper.
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inverse condemnation actions, including those asserting the existence of a
regulatory taking.
A. An Alternative Proposal
Obviously, the payment of full compensation to owners requires knowing
the value that owners attach to their property. While the market value
component is both observable and verifiable by third parties, the additional
surplus enjoyed by the particular owner is generally not. Hence, to compensate
owners for their additional surplus the legal system must rely on unverifiable
information supplied by owners. Herein lies the rub. Where the owner’s
testimony serves as the basis for determining compensation awards, the owner
has every incentive to exaggerate.110 It is for this reason that compensation
doctrine systematically disregards those components of surplus value that
cannot be readily verified, such as surplus subjective value. In short, then,
takings law pays less than full compensation for practical, rather than
principled, reasons.
In a classic article, Saul Levmore pointed a way out of this dilemma.111
Drawing upon the experience of an income tax system that has relied on selfreporting for many years, Levmore noted that sufficient penalties can curb
parties’ tendencies to underreport taxable income. He then suggested importing
the same approach to the context of property taxes by allowing owners to
assess their own property value subject to penalties designed to deter underreporting. Specifically, to balance the tendency to underreport and reduce tax
liability, Levmore suggested that self-reported value would also serve as the
property’s sale price.112 In other words, if the owner of Blackacre reported its
value as $100 for purposes of property tax liability, anyone could force the
owner to part with Blackacre in exchange for $100. Importantly, Levmore
included the government in the group of potential purchasers who could force a
sale.113
A handful of other scholars have also examined the possibility of using
self-assessment to discover subjective value and have proposed other
mechanisms for ensuring truthfulness. Peter Colwell suggested a scheme
similar to Levmore’s.114 Lee Anne Fennell, by contrast, recommended
permitting owners to declare a subjective value of up to 200% of market value;
however, once the declarations were made, owners could no longer challenge a
110. Fennell, supra note 14, at 1419.
111. Saul Levmore, Self-Assessed Valuation Systems for Tort and Other Law, 68 VA.
L. REV. 771 (1982).
112. Id. at 779.
113. Id. at 789.
114. Peter F. Colwell, Privatization of Assessment, Zoning, and Eminent Domain,
ORER LETTER (Office of Real Estate Research at the Univ. of Ill. at Urbana-Champaign,
Urbana-Champaign, Ill.), Spring 1990, at 1.
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proposed taking for lack of “public use.”115 Economists have proposed a
number of additional reserve price-revelation mechanisms of general
application.116
Our proposal is closest to Levmore’s, though it is in many ways the
obverse. While Levmore’s main goal was to ensure higher tax revenues to the
government, our goal is to guarantee full compensation to property owners. As
a result, in contrast to Levmore, the foremost challenge we face is over- (rather
than under-) reporting. As we will explain later, property tax law and
compensation law do not treat assessed property value identically.
Consequently, the shift in focus from tax law to eminent domain compensation
has important policy ramifications.
Our mechanism tracks the eminent domain process and hence may be
divided into three time periods. In the first time period, the government
declares its intent to condemn a certain lot or set of lots.117 Once such a
declaration is made, the owner is asked to report the value she attaches to the
property. After the owner submits her report, the government may either seize
the property at the declared value or forego its plan to condemn that property.
To use finance terminology, under our proposal, the property owner gets to set
the strike price for the government option to take.118 The third time period
follows the government decision. If the government declines to take the
property, two restrictions will be imposed on the property owners. First, the
owners will not be able to transfer the property for less than the self-reported
value. Second, their property tax liability will be based on the self-reported
valuation. However, for reasons we explain shortly, the government will not
collect the full amount paid by the owners.
The two limitations we propose warrant further explanation. The first
limitation is essentially a partial inalienability restraint. It does not fully bar
owners from transferring their property. Rather, it only sets a price floor (at the
115. See Fennell, supra note 79, at 995-1002. Fennell would add a tax rebate to
encourage owners to voluntarily declare a value and expose their property to taking.
116. The economic literature on mechanisms for revealing reserve prices for public
goods is extensive and important, albeit little applied in the real world and of surprisingly
little impact in the legal academy. See, e.g., Edward H. Clarke, Multipart Pricing of Public
Goods, 11 PUB. CHOICE 17 (1971); Theodore Groves & Martin Loeb, Incentives and Public
Inputs, 4 J. PUB. ECON. 211 (1975); Theodore Groves & John Ledyard, Optimal Allocation
of Public Goods: A Solution to the “Free Rider” Problem, 45 ECONOMETRICA 783 (1977);
T. Nicolaus Tideman & Gordon Tullock, A New and Superior Process for Making Social
Choices, 84 J. POL. ECON. 1145 (1976); Peter J. Hammond, Symposium on Incentive
Compatibility, 46 REV. ECON. STUD. 181 (1979). The Nobel Prize-winning work of William
Vickrey, which discussed general reserve price revelation in auctions, laid the foundation for
Groves’s and Clarke’s advances, and deserves particular note. See William Vickrey,
Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders, 16 J. FIN. 8 (1961).
117. To reduce the possibility of strategic overreporting, the government should
register its intent to take all plots for any given project simultaneously.
118. For a discussion of eminent domain as a call option, see IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL
LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS 4 (2005).
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self-assessed amount) for transfer. Inalienability does not only apply to
commercial sales but also to gifts and more generally to all fee simple transfers
in order to avoid fraudulent circumventions of the inalienability restriction. The
partial inalienability restraint will remain in force for the life of the owner,119
unless the owner transfers the property, in which event the restraint will expire.
If the owner wants to transfer the property at less than the self-assessed
amount, she may overcome the inalienability restraint by paying a redemption
fee to the government at the time of an otherwise-forbidden transfer. Where an
owner seeks to transfer the property for less than the self-reported value, she
may do so if she pays the government a fee equal to the difference between the
sale price and the self-reported value.
The tax restraint is more complicated. Ordinarily, property taxes are set
according to a value assessed by a government assessor and have no connection
with other values that might be assigned to the property by other government
bodies.120 We do not propose changing this basic fact. Only when the
government indicates its intent to seize a particular parcel will our proposal
come into play. Once the property owner has submitted her reported value for
purposes of eminent domain, the property tax assessor will have to keep track
of two values—the government-assessed value and the surplus, that is, the
amount by which the self-reported value exceeds the government-assessed
value. The government-assessed value will continue to serve as the basis of the
regular property tax bill. However, there will be an additional property tax
assessed on the surplus.
The rate at which the surplus will be taxed can best be explained in two
stages. Consider first the possibility of taxing the surplus at its nominal value at
the same rate as the government-assessed value. For example, consider a
property with a government-assessed value of $200,000, market value of
$250,000, and self-reported value of $300,000. Additionally, assume that the
property tax rate is 1% of assessed value. Under this option, the owner’s tax
liability will be $3000.
We suggest, however, taxing the surplus at an assessment-adjusted rate,
rather than at nominal value. Specifically, rather than pay tax on the full
amount of the surplus, the owner should pay tax only on the difference between
self-reported value and market value, further discounted to reflect the ratio
119. We avoid an infinite partial inalienability period out of respect for property law’s
general (and justified) dislike of absolute restraints on alienability. See, e.g., JESSE
DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 54 (5th ed. 2002). Additionally, we note that due
to the effects of discounting future value, a lifetime restraint will often not be significantly
less costly to owners than an infinite restraint. We discuss the particular problems raised by
elderly owners in infra Part IV.B.
120. See, e.g., Clifford H. Goodall & Seth A. Goodall, Property Tax: A Primer and a
Modest Proposal for Maine, 57 ME. L. REV. 585, 597 (2005) (“Modern property tax limits
use a variety of techniques, including direct limits on revenue growth, levy limits, and
property tax caps that indirectly limit tax revenue growth, as well as limiting growth rates for
assessed values.”).
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between assessed and market value. This can best be understood by returning
to the previous example. As noted above, the nominal value of the surplus is
$100,000 (self-reported value minus government-assessed value), and the tax
due would therefore be $1000 under a nominal surplus tax. However, under our
proposal, the taxable amount is based only on the discounted value of the
owner premium. Specifically, we first calculate the amount by which the selfreported value exceeds market value—here, $50,000. Next, we calculate the
ratio at which government-assessed value is discounted relative to market
value—here, the assessed value is 80% of the market value. Finally, the owner
premium is discounted by the same amount in order to arrive at the taxable
surplus—here, 80% x $50,000 = $40,000. Thus, under the second option, the
taxpayer would pay a total property tax bill of $2400.
To illustrate how the two restrictions operate, we return to the example of
the Introduction, modifying the numbers to accord with the previous example.
The City of Chicago has declared its desire to use its power of eminent domain
to seize realty owned by Professor Richard Epstein for the purpose of building
a public university. The Cook County Assessor’s Office has assessed the value
of Blackacre at $200,000 for the purpose of property tax rolls, and the actual
market value of the property is $250,000. Professor Epstein values Blackacre at
$300,000, and he so reports. If the city takes the property, it will have to pay
Epstein the full $300,000. If not, Epstein will retain the property subject to the
inalienability and property tax restraints. He will only be able to sell Blackacre
for less than $300,000 if he pays the City of Chicago the difference between
this amount and the eventual sale price. Second, Epstein will receive a tax bill
adjusted for his self-assessed value of $300,000 rather than the former tax roll
assessment of $200,000. Professor Epstein’s taxable property value will be
$240,000, and five-sixths of his tax bill will be paid to the municipality, and the
other sixth to Professor Epstein’s charity of choice—naturally, the Federalist
Society.121
If Professor Epstein sells Blackacre to Professor Cass Sunstein for
$210,000 two years later, he will have to pay $90,000 to the City of Chicago as
a redemption fee. This transfer will end both the inalienability and tax
restraints.
Both the inalienability and tax restraints will require adjustments in order
to remain viable over the course of time. They must be updated yearly for the
effects of inflation and fluctuations in the real estate market. We suggest that
this could best be accomplished by looking to a local housing price index.
Additionally, the inalienability restraint will need to take a broad view of
what is considered a “transfer” in order to prevent circumvention of the
restraint through creative assignment of rights without full transfer of
ownership (as in, for example, the creation of a long-term lease). Restricted
121. As we explain in Part IV.A, infra, the surplus tax assessment should go to charity
rather than to the government.
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transfers should include subsets of ownership rights and even some financing
mechanisms such as mortgaging.
Finally, it bears emphasis that while our proposal has been based upon a
traditional exercise of eminent domain over land, it can be used in other
contexts as well. Self-assessment may be used, for example, for determining
compensation for state actions deemed regulatory takings. Specifically, where
an owner successfully challenges a government action under an inverse taking
suit, the court can consider ordering a self-assessment for determining the
amount of compensation to be paid in the event that the government elects to
carry out the deemed regulatory taking. The self-assessment would be subject
to all the rules outlined here in order to ensure its accuracy as a basis for
compensation.122 Unfortunately, however, it is not possible to extend our selfassessment proposal to takings of personal property (or real property owned by
tax-exempt organizations) unless the property is subject to periodic taxes based
upon the property’s value.
B. Assessing Self-Assessment
Our proposed mechanism represents an improvement over existing takings
compensation doctrine in two important ways. First, it ensures the payment of
full compensation to condemnees and hence brings compensation practice into
closer alignment with the demands of efficiency and fairness. Second, it
represents a reduction in transaction costs relative to the existing regime. The
current regime, by contrast, relies on expensive judicial determination of
compensation awards when private negotiations break down.
In this Subpart, we will discuss the incentive structure created by our
proposal and delineate its limitations. It is important to note at the outset that
while our model does not yield a first-best result—compensation at precisely
the owner’s reserve price123—it brings us much closer to accurate
compensation at a reasonable administrative cost.124 Due to the lack of a
mechanism that perfectly matches the penalties on overreporting with its
rewards, it is very difficult to design a legal apparatus that eliminates altogether
122. There are limits to the ability to implement our system of self-assessment in cases
of implied takings. If there is no ability to exclude individual properties from a regulatory
system or from the spillover effects of a physical or regulatory taking, the government
cannot rely on self-assessment to create an accurate benchmark for determining subjective
value. Thus, compensation for some kinds of regulatory takings and most derivative takings
would have to be determined by market values or some other system. See Abraham Bell &
Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 87 VA. L. REV. 277 (2001).
123. This is a first-best result if not inclusive of excessive development. See supra Part
I.B.
124. Cf. Benjamin E. Hermalin, An Economic Analysis of Takings, 11 J.L. ECON. &
ORG. 64, 70-71 (1995) (arguing that first-best results can be reached by paying
compensation equal to the value of the property to the taking authority); Robert Innes,
Takings, Compensation, and Equal Treatment for Owners of Developed and Undeveloped
Property, 40 J.L. & ECON. 403, 413-14 (1997) (noting the same point).
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undercompensation, on the one hand, and the blocking of efficient takings, on
the other.
To understand the incentive structure generated by our proposal, it is
helpful to start with a simpler scenario: takings compensation on the basis of
self-reported values without penalties. In this case, no inefficient taking will
occur because the owner has no reason to report a value lower than her reserve
price; but certain efficient takings will be thwarted. Since the owner faces no
penalty for exaggerating, her self-report will be based on her best estimation of
the value of her lot to the government, so long as it is greater than the reserve
price.125 Because claiming too much runs the risk of forgoing a profit, owners
will likely report an amount lower than their actual estimation of the value of
the lot for the government.
In the case of land assembly, matters become more complicated. Here,
owners will have to take account of two additional factors: the value of the
entire project to the government and the likely behavior of other owners. In
order to extract the marginal surplus value of the property to the government,
owners will base their self-reporting on the total surplus of the project to the
government, adjusted to the likely reports of other owners. In other words,
property owners will attempt to maximize their personal payoff subject to the
limitation that all reports must not exceed the total value of the project to the
government.126 This process is prone to errors and has no stable equilibrium
solution, leading to the well-known holdout problem that justifies eminent
domain.127
The real barrier to efficient outcomes under such a self-reporting scheme is
that the parties may make mistakes on account of information and incentive
constraints. While the self-report eliminates the possibility that the government
will seize a property whose reserve price exceeds the true value to the
government, the owner may falsely report a reserve price that exceeds the
estimated value to the government.128
Enter the two penalties we propose. The introduction of penalties greatly
increases the chance that efficient takings will be carried out by changing the
reporting incentives of property owners. Self-reporting potentially imposes two
additional costs—a higher tax burden and a partial inalienability restraint which
125. While this might have undesirable distributive effects, it will lead to the optimal
number of takings.
126. This is due to the fact that if the total self-reported amount exceeds the
government’s expected value, the government will forgo the project.
127. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 62 (6th ed.
2003) (justifying eminent domain as a mechanism for overcoming holdouts); STEVEN
SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 124 (2004) (arguing the same
point).
128. If the owner reports a price in excess of the true reserve price but less than the
value to the government, the government will still choose to take, leading to an efficient
assignment of the property. The owner will, however, successfully appropriate a share of the
government surplus.
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makes property less liquid. The inalienability restraint will never induce
owners to report a price lower than their reserve price for reasons we will
explain shortly. However, it will not completely eliminate the possibility that
owners will report a price greater than reserve price (and, accidentally, in
excess of government value) and thereby block efficient takings. The tax
restraint produces a blanket incentive to report lower values. Notably, this
effect on incentives applies even if the reported price is lower than the reserve
price. At any reported value greater than the market price, even where less than
the reserve price, the owner will face a higher property tax bill. However, the
discounting of the surplus tax significantly reduces the power of this incentive.
The result, we submit, is that owners will be driven to reporting values close to
their reserve prices.
Issues of timing at the outset of the takings process will be important to the
accuracy of the incentives. The government must issue all proposals for takings
for a given project simultaneously, with simultaneous deadlines for selfreported values. If the government staggers the reports, owners will be able to
report strategically, based on other owner reports, in order to try to capture all
of the government surplus.
We now turn to a more precise examination of the incentive structure
created by our proposed penalties. As we have seen, in the absence of penalties,
all reporting is strategic and is designed to capture as much of the government
surplus as possible. However, the inalienability restraint places a cost on excess
reporting by making the property more illiquid, thereby reducing the ability of
the owner to enjoy the full subjective value. Specifically, owners will not be
able to translate the surplus subjective value into other assets unless they sell
the property at the reported price. For any lower price, owners will lose part of
the value they attach to their property. However, since owners would generally
not sell their property for less than the reserve price, the inalienability restraint
does not create a substantial risk of reporting a price lower than reserve value.
Unfortunately, the inalienability restraint, on its own, does not provide a
sufficient check on owner’s predisposition to overreport. First, not all owners
wish to transfer title to their property in the foreseeable future. Some owners
derive value from their properties in ways other than transfer, for example,
through self-use or leasing. Moreover, many owners have no realistic
expectation of receiving an offer that would exceed their reserve price and
consequently have no expectation of parting with their property. Such owners
derive value from their property through possession and use. Second, even for
owners who consider transfer, the partial inalienability restraint does not
impose a penalty on exaggeration commensurate with the benefit. The
benchmark for the gain from exaggeration is still the value the government
places on the project, whereas the cost is represented by the expected loss in
the case of a future sale. Since the two measures—the government value and
the future sale price—bear no necessary relationship to one another, there will
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be cases where owners will expect to gain much more from exaggerated selfreports than they will lose.
The tax restraint depresses the incentive to self-report prices above market
price, and thereby further reduces the incentive to exaggerate. Because the tax
burden is discounted, the tax restraint only takes effect when self-reported
values are higher than market price. For any increment above market price, the
owner should expect to pay the penalty of increased taxes if the government
forgoes carrying out the taking. Because the tax liability is affected not only by
the above-market premium reported, but also by the probability of taking,
owners will be particularly careful not to exceed their estimation of the
government’s expected value. Naturally, however, owners are unlikely to have
very good information about the likelihood of a taking and the government’s
value.
Alas, the tax restraint does not bear any direct relationship to the owner’s
reserve price. For a self-reported price above reserve price, an owner will have
to compare the expected gains of taking compensation above reserve
(discounted by the possibility that a taking will not take place) with the
expected cost of a tax liability for above-market value (discounted by the
possibility that a taking will take place). For a self-reported price below
reserve, the owner will have to compare two kinds of costs: the expected cost
of subjective value not covered by taking compensation (discounted by the
possibility that a taking will not take place) and the expected cost of a tax
liability for above-market value (discounted by the possibility that a taking will
take place). In either case, the owner’s reported value will be based upon
estimations of government value and the likelihood of taking, rather than
reserve price.
Nevertheless, the tax restraint does leave room for reporting values above
market price (allowing recapture of some subjective value). And because its
effects are discounted, it does not create excessive pressure to report low
values.
Together, the inalienability and tax restraints create an imperfect but
definite incentive to report values close to the reserve price. There is no
incentive whatsoever to report values lower than the market price. For supramarket, sub-reserve prices, only the tax restraint is important. Finally, for
supra-reserve prices, both the tax and inalienability restraints play a role in
curbing exaggerations. Our analysis is summarized in Table 1.
Per our earlier discussion, eminent domain may give rise to two types of
inefficiencies. First, when owners are undercompensated, exercises of eminent
domain may lead to the implementation of inefficient projects. We refer to this
possibility as Type I inefficiency. Second, when owners are overcompensated,
the need to pay excess compensation may lead the government to cancel
efficient development projects. We refer to this as Type II inefficiency.129
129. It should be noted that Type II inefficiencies can also occur from
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Table 1. Efficiency of Eminent Domain Under Different Compensation Regimes
Self-Reporting Self-Reporting
Without
with Penalties
Current Policy
Penalty
(Our Proposal)
Type I: Inefficient Project
Implemented

Possible130

Impossible131

Possible but
rare132

Type II: Efficient Project
Not Implemented

Possible but
rare133

Common134

Possible but
rare135

Because the current compensation regime does not compensate owners for
the full value they attach to their properties, it may generate a relatively high
number of Type I inefficiencies. In addition, the current compensation regime
may also generate Type II inefficiencies—i.e., prevent efficient projects from
moving forward—where, due to judicial error about market value, courts
require compensation above the reserve price of condemnees
(overcompensation) or where the administrative cost of meting out
compensation is prohibitively high.
Self-reporting without penalties eliminates the problem of Type I
inefficiencies. Under this regime, owners get to set their own price and will
naturally refuse to sell for less than the value they place on their property.
However, self-reporting without penalties may lead to a high number of Type

undercompensation if those to be undercompensated are politically powerful enough to
block an efficient project. See supra Part I.C. In this Part, and in Table 1, we limit our
analysis to inefficiencies caused by the direct financial costs of projects percieved by
government actors.
130. Under the current regime, Type I inefficiency will occur when the government’s
value is higher than the market value but lower than the owner’s reserve price.
131. Under a regime of self-reporting without penalty, no Type I inefficiencies will
occur because the owner’s report will never fall below her reserve price.
132. Our proposal admits of Type I inefficiency because property taxes are ordinarily
not based on reserve prices. Consequently, the tax penalty may cause owners to report values
lower than their reserve price, leaving open the possibility that the value to the government
will exceed the reported price but be lower than the reserve price.
133. Under the current regime, Type II inefficiencies may occur if courts
overcompensate condemnees, i.e., when courts award damages that—together with the
market price—exceed the value of the property for the government.
134. A regime of self-reporting without penalty may often give rise to Type II
inefficiencies since property owners operating under this regime will try to appropriate as
much of the government surplus as possible. Type II inefficiencies will occur whenever the
owners who operate under conditions of imperfect information overestimate the government
surplus from the project or overestimate their ability to extract shares of that surplus relative
to other owners.
135. Our proposal admits of Type II inefficiency only in the case where the reported
price is greater than both the owner’s reserve price and the government value. Such cases
will be rare but may nevertheless happen if the owner believes that the government project
will be implemented irrespective of the price she reports.
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II inefficiencies. Owners may exaggerate their estimation of the government
value and block execution of the project altogether.
With a small refinement, we introduce below, self-reporting with penalties
can eliminate all Type I inefficiencies, while dramatically reducing Type II
inefficiencies. To eliminate all Type I inefficiency, our proposed system of
self-reporting should incorporate one small refinement: as far as tax liability is
concerned, self-reporting owners will not be able to reduce their liability below
what they paid prior to the self-assessment. In other words, the tax amount paid
by owners prior to the self-assessment will serve as a floor for their new tax
liability. This means that under no circumstances, will self-reporting owners be
able to lower their property tax payments—relative to the preexisting
situation—by submitting excessively low reports. This simple refinement
prevents owners who do not plan to part company with their properties from
taking advantage of our proposed mechanism to minimize their property taxes.
With this refinement, our proposal only admits of Type II inefficiencies. As far
as Type II inefficiencies are concerned, owners will rarely overshoot
government value, since the price of exaggerated reports of property value
includes an alienability restriction as well as greater tax liabilities.
At the end of the day, the magnitude of the gap between the reported value
and the owner’s subjective value will depend on the owner’s subjective
estimate of the probability that the government will take her property. If the
owner believes that the government taking is a certainty, then she has an
incentive to report a value in excess of her subjective value: the value she
estimates the government places on the property. If, on the other hand, the
owner believes that there is no chance that the government will carry out the
taking, then the reported value should coincide with market value. In between
these extreme cases, where the owner’s reported value significantly affects the
likelihood of a taking, the owner’s subjective value will be the important
touchstone for owner self-assessments. Since the government usually has
several options to advance its plan and in some instances may choose to forego
the taking altogether, these intermediate cases should constitute the
overwhelming majority
IV. POTENTIAL OBJECTIONS
In this Part, we address potential objections to our proposal. We focus on
potential abuses of our model both by the government and by property owners
and explain how they can be remedied.
A. Government Abuse
A seemingly serious concern raised by our proposal is that the government
may abuse it to boost its property tax base. The introduction of heightened tax
liability may spur the government to declare multiple eminent domain projects

February 2007]

TAKING COMPENSATION PRIVATE

901

(without intending to carry them out), force the affected owners to reveal their
true valuations, and then forego the takings and enjoy the increased tax
revenues.136
This concern may be remedied by “decoupling” the amount owners will
pay from the amount the government will collect.137 While the owner’s tax
liability will, indeed, be based on her report, the government will not be
entitled to this entire amount. The additional increment of property tax (based
on the self-assessment) will not be paid to the government; instead, the
property owner will be free to donate it to a charity of her choice. For example,
if the owner’s property tax liability prior to the self-assessment was $3000 per
year and after the self-assessment is $3500 per year, the government will
continue to collect $3000 and the additional $500 will be paid to one of the
owner’s favorite charities. This can be implemented by simple methods such as
a check-off box in the property tax bill.138 Like the inalienability restraint, the
surplus tax liability should end once the property is transferred.
The diversion of surplus tax revenues to a charity of the owner’s choice,
rather than the government itself, should dramatically reduce the incentive of
the government to exercise its eminent domain power excessively139 and
provides both sides with an incentive to act efficiently.
B. Corner Cases
A different challenge to our proposal is presented by owners who have no
realistic expectation of sale during their lives, such as elderly owners. Elderly
136. It should be noted at the outset that this concern does not arise in all takings
cases. This is because all the different levels of government—local, state, and federal—may
exercise the power of eminent domain while property taxes are generally collected only at
the local level. Accordingly, it is unlikely that most state and federal takings decisions will
be driven by the desire to raise property tax assessments. Moreover, even at the local level,
decisions to take property may be made by government bodies that are funded by dedicated
funds or excise taxes and therefore do not directly benefit from property tax hikes.
137. The decoupling strategy is most prominently associated with Mitchell Polinsky
and Yeon-Koo Che. See A. Mitchell Polinsky & Yeon-Koo Che, Decoupling Liability:
Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation, 22 RAND J. ECON. 562 (1991).
138. Our model is the check-off box for presidential election financing on federal tax
forms.
139. There remains a residual concern that the government may declare its intent to
take properties simply in order to raise revenues to charitable organizations. While this
concern is not baseless, we do not believe it is a crucial one. We entrust the choice of
charities to the affected owner. Given the wide range of charities, it is hard to see how the
government can use our mechanism to target donations to charities on an ideological basis.
Since the government has no way of knowing how the additional property taxes will affect
optional charitable giving, it cannot even know if, as a whole, charities will enjoy greater
donations. Even if the government could be certain of greater charitable revenues, the
activities of charities are so diverse that the government could not reliably plan on reducing
any line-item in the budget. Hence, it is quite far-fetched to believe that the government
would rely on our mechanism as a means for funding charitable activities.
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owners will expect to transfer title only upon their death, through bequest or
inheritance. The result is that the value of the expected sanction imposed by the
inalienability restraint will be limited. Hence, such owners may have a greater
motivation to overstate their self-assessment price.
While we recognize that elderly owners pose a challenge for our scheme,
this challenge should not be overstated. First, bear in mind that the property tax
restraint will apply to elderly owners who fail to sell at their self-assessed price.
The increased tax liability will naturally curb the incentive of elderly owners to
overstate the value they attach to their properties.
Second, although folk wisdom suggests that elderly owners are likely to
hold out against efficient development, this perception may be more of a myth
than reality. On average, the cost of eminent domain for elderly owners is
higher than it is for other owners. This is because the cost of transition is
especially high for elderly owners, meaning they likely face higher transaction
costs in replacing property. Consequently, compensation at market value, as is
the case under current doctrine, disproportionately undercompensates elderly
owners, leaving them with a higher incentive for opposing all projects requiring
them to surrender property for market price. Our proposal, by contrast,
guarantees elderly owners full compensation at their subjective value in the
event of a taking and, hence, may eliminate their special motivation to hold out.
To the degree that there is still a concern about overreporting by the
elderly, our proposal may be modified by extending the period of the penalties
beyond the lifetime of the owners. For example, the inalienability period could
be extended to lifetime plus twenty years rather than just lifetime.140
C. Changed Circumstances
Extreme changes in circumstances may dramatically alter subjective value
without connection to prevailing property market prices in the area. For
example, the owners of a residential lot may divorce, leaving them unable to
enjoy the property together and without their former ability to extract high
surplus value from the property. Additionally, even if subjective value remains
in the same proportion to market value, an owner might encounter such
extreme liquidity problems as to be ready to part with substantial surplus
subjective value simply in order to be able to translate the asset into a more
liquid form. This may happen, for example, when an owner wishes to send her
daughter to college.
There is a degree to which, irrespective of the ex ante assessment, an
owner will be exposed to the possibility of ex post inefficiencies. Specifically,
the owner may be exposed to circumstances where the ex post subjective value

140. Even here, there will still be a potential problem with reporting as elderly owners
may discount some effects of the restraints because they apply only indirectly, i.e., to their
successors. This difference, however, is one of degree rather than kind.
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of the property has descended below the price to be offered by a potential
purchaser, but the owner continues inefficiently to hold on to the property
because the gains from sale are insufficient to justify paying the transfer
redemption fee.
We believe, however, that most owners will be able to take account of
likely changes in circumstances in calculating their self-assessed values.
Additionally, it must be borne in mind that the adverse effects of changed
circumstances are limited to a very small domain. Owners will only have to
absorb liquidity losses or subjective value losses to the extent of the expected
redemption fee. If the liquidity or subjective value loss exceeds this amount,
the owner will pay the fee and transfer the property.
D. Gaming the System
As in other situations in which penalties or rewards are triggered by events,
parties may try to game the system by dressing up non-events as trigger events
in order to collect rewards or hiding trigger events as something else in order to
avoid penalty. In other fields of law such maneuvers can be seen, for example,
in collusive transfers of property in order to shield assets from creditors or
characterizations of loans as sales in order to protect security interests.
Our proposal for self-assessment too is vulnerable to collusive transfer
between closely related persons. An owner might declare a high self-assessed
value and then seek to avoid the associated penalties by collusively transferring
the property to a close associate, allegedly at the self-assessed price but
actually for a lower amount. To a degree, this strategy may be thwarted by
existing tax liabilities. A collusive transfer may, for instance, expose the
transferor to a high capital gains tax. More generally, we propose granting the
government the power to petition courts to set aside fraudulent transactions, or,
at least, to recharacterize them for purposes of the penalties. While this power
may seem drastic, it is commonly used to deal with the problems of collusive
transfers in many other fields of law,141 such as bankruptcy.142
E. What’s Left of Eminent Domain?
A broader objection would claim that our proposal essentially eliminates
eminent domain. The essence of eminent domain is the ability to force an
owner to part with title of an asset, substituting the owner’s property rule
protection for a liability rule protection.143 We openly admit that our proposal
141. Fraudulent conveyance law dates back to the Statute of Elizabeth, (1570) 13 Eliz.,
c. 5 (Eng.). See also Twyne’s Case, (1601) 76 Eng. Rep. 809 (Star Chamber). See generally
Douglas G. Baird & Thomas H. Jackson, Fraudulent Conveyance Law and Its Proper
Domain, 38 VAND. L. REV. 829 (1985).
142. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 548 (2007).
143. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV.
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transforms the nature of eminent domain, restoring in the owner many of the
traditional benefits of property rule protection. Does this change do away with
all the benefits of eminent domain? The power of eminent domain is necessary
to enable the state to provide public goods. Standard economic theory
maintains that without eminent domain, the state will not be able to procure the
assets necessary for the provision of public goods on account of information
asymmetries and strategic holdouts.144 Eminent domain allows the government
to sidestep these strategic difficulties by temporarily altering the nature of the
owner’s protection to that of a liability rule, thereby empowering the state to
force a sale.145
Although we do away with the power of the state to force a sale at market
price, we do not divest the state of its coercive powers. While the state can no
longer force a sale at market value, owners only have the ability to name their
own price, not to issue a blanket refusal to sell. Moreover, the introduction of
the tax and inalienability restraints provides owners with a powerful incentive
to report accurately the subjective value they attach to their property. Granted,
the power we give to owners to set the price of their properties may in some
cases result in a government decision to forego a taking at the self-assessed
price. But this should only worry us if the self-assessed price is exaggerated. So
long as the self-assessed price reflects the subjective value to the owner, we do
not want the state to take the property unless its value to the state exceeds the
self-assessed price; otherwise, the planned taking is inefficient.
We acknowledge that ours is not a first-best solution and that as a result, in
some cases, exaggerated self-reports may thwart efficient development
projects. However, this inefficiency does not signal the failure of our proposal.
Current compensation doctrine is also susceptible to efficiency losses such as
where courts set compensation too low and the government proceeds with
inefficient projects. While we lack empirical data to demonstrate the relative
sizes of these inefficiencies, we suspect that efficiency losses are greater under
the current system than they would be under our proposed alternative.
A case of particular concern for us is that of irrational owners of unique
assets. While an irrational owner is of little importance when the asset at issue
has ready substitutes and is traded in a functioning market, the irrational owner
of a unique good without substitutes presents a nettlesome problem. In such
cases, the irrational owner may as well name a price that is outrageously high,
placing an inefficient (and irrational) block on a worthy project. This concern
may be especially acute in times of national emergency.
To alleviate this concern, an additional safety valve may be added to our
proposal. In instances of declared national emergency, the government could be
granted the power to petition a court to override the self-assessed valuation and
1, 59-64 (2002); Fennell, supra note 14; Merrill, supra note 31, at 64.
144. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note 127, at 62.
145. Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 143.
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substitute a court determination of the owner’s subjective value. For example,
this special procedure may be invoked in war time in order to seize a precious
mineral necessary for the production of weaponry after the owner dramatically
overassessed the price of the asset.146
CONCLUSION
Eminent domain is one of the most extreme weapons in the government’s
arsenal of powers that affect private citizenry. Therefore, it is not surprising
that eminent domain has been at the center of many heated debates in the legal
academy and outside of it.147 Dissatisfaction with compensation practices has
even led, of late, legal scholars and economists to question the need for this
controversial power. For example, in explaining why he believes eminent
domain to be undesirable in this day and age,148 Nobel laureate Gary Becker
146. This exception might be broadened to include all cases where there is serious risk
of the moral hazard of compensation causing substantial overdevelopment of property. This
would appear to be the case when such overdevelopment is available and cost-efficient for
the owner whose property is to be seized, and where substitutes are absent and the
substantial gap between government value and owner value is apparent to the owner. Cf.
Miceli, supra note 65.
147. Daniel Farber issued one of the milder summaries of the state of takings law:
“[T]here is no consensus today about takings law—only a general belief that the takings
problem is difficult and that takings doctrine is a mess.” Daniel Farber, Public Choice and
Just Compensation, 9 CONST. COMMENT. 279, 279 (1992). Jed Rubenfeld was less charitable,
opining that “[t]hroughout constitutional jurisprudence, only the right of privacy can
compete seriously with takings law for the doctrine-in-most-desperate-need-of-a-principle
prize.” Jed Rubenfeld, Usings, 102 YALE L.J. 1077, 1081 (1993). There is no shortage of
critics of the jurisprudence of takings. See Gideon Kanner, Hunting the Snark, Not the
Quark: Has the Supreme Court Been Competent in Its Effort to Formulate Coherent
Regulatory Takings Law?, 30 URB. LAW. 307, 308 (1998); (“The incoherence of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s output in this field has by now been demonstrated time and again by
practitioners and academic commentators ad nauseam, and I refuse to add to the ongoing
gratuitous slaughter of trees for the paper consumed in this frustrating and increasingly
pointless enterprise.”).
148. Becker believes that through time the costs of the eminent domain power have
eclipsed the benefits:
In the 18th, 19th, and early 20th centuries, governments did rather little, so there was not
much to fear from great abuse of the eminent domain constitutional clause. In fact, the first
real eminent domain case was not decided until 1876. Now, however, government at all
levels do [sic] so much that the temptation is irresistible to use eminent domain
condemnation proceedings to hasten and cheapen their accumulation of property for various
projects, regardless of a projects [sic] merits.
. . . [U]sually a road can take competing paths, a power plant can be built in different
locations, and so forth, so that buyers, government or private, can use the leverage from
competition among sites to reduce the advantage of holding out. And sometimes they can
build around stubborn holdouts, as happened when the property to build the privately
accumulated Rockefeller Center was put together[.]
I am not claiming that a system without eminent domain would work perfectly—it would
not. But modern governments have more than enough power through the power to tax and
regulate.

Posting of Gary Becker to The Becker-Posner Blog, On Eminent Domain,
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/archives/2005/06/index.html (June 27, 2005).
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wrote, “To me, the only reasonable interpretation of ‘fair compensation’ is the
worth of property to the present owners.”149
Becker is not alone. There is little doubt that the current compensation
practice, which many perceive as neither fair nor efficient, is a major
contributor to the general dissatisfaction with eminent domain and the calls for
its abolition. It is quite likely, therefore, that if property owners received full
compensation for the loss occasioned on them by eminent domain exercises,
the public sentiment toward eminent domain would be more favorable.
In this Article, we developed a mechanism that allows policymakers to
achieve this goal. Our self-assessment proposal, by allowing property owners
to name their compensation award, yields a fairer and more efficient eminent
domain regime. Even the sharpest opponents of eminent domain recognize that
“[e]liminating the eminent domain clause from the Constitution is obviously
not feasible in any foreseeable time frame.”150 In light of this fact, it becomes
all the more important to ensure that affected property owners receive full
compensation for their losses.

149. Id. (emphasis added).
150. Id.

